

Success in structural reform and how to get there – Introduction to the institutional determinants of growth

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Introduction

- Behind-the-border reforms are critical to growth
- → Economic integration is not an end in itself, but an outcome of domestic reforms that increase the general contestability of markets
 - allowing foreign competitors to enter
 - allowing domestic new entrants to enter
 - allowing all comers to enter, not just selected ones
- Reforms need to safeguard competition, not particular competitors



The role of institutions

- Domestic reform is not easy, because different players are involved
 - incumbent producers
 - potential foreign entrants

- consumers
- using and supplying industries
- potential new domestic entrants
 - governments
- To get better growth outcomes, need to understand
 - what constitutes better policies → need institutions to implement them
 - how to get there → also need institutions to support the policy-making process



The dynamic problem

- How do we get from current policies to optimal or better policies?
- Raises three subsidiary questions:
 - What stops better policies being adopted?
 - How does (or should) the policy development process work?
 - What institutions could lead to better policy-making processes?



What stops better policies being adopted?

- 1. Governments do not know what is best (or better) practice
 - → They need help in undertaking policy reviews to identify better options
 - → Governments could share experience about better practice
- 2. Governments know what is better practice, but face political resistance from vested interests
 - → They need policy review institutions to help marshal countervailing interests
 - Governments could share experience about managing vested interests



What stops better policies being adopted?

- 3. Governments do not want better practice, because they are benefiting from the rents created by bad policy
 - → They will try to ensure that government-sponsored review institutions are sidelined
 - → There is still a role for private/independent review institutions to marshal countervailing interests
- → Two roles for policy reviews
 - Identifying better practice policy reviews as a technical solution
 - Managing vested interests (which may include government) policy reviews as a strategy



How can policy reviews help manage vested interests?

- Set the agenda
 - Policy reform won't happen if nobody talks about it
- Set the parameters of the debate
- Raise the level of the debate
 - Raise level of sophistication
 - Depoliticise
- 'Name and shame' the recipients of special deals
- Help marshal countervailing interests
 - Build a coalition for reform
- Help show what reform combinations can lead to a true 'Pareto improvement'
 - Build a grand coalition for reform



Policy reviews can also help with policy coordination

- Need a responsible Minister to take the lead
- Minister may need the help of a coordinating agency to lead the decision-making process and ensure that decisions are honoured
- Review institutions can consult among government departments as well as producer interests, thus helping coordination
- Ex ante and ex post reviews can strengthen the hand of coordinating agencies (or Minister) in the decision-making and implementation phases
 - provide arguments for reform
 - provide threat of exposure for non-performance



What institutional *qualities* are required to carry out policy reviews?

Independence

- Not bound by government policy
- No stake in the status quo

Economy-wide view

- Not bound by producer interests
- Also consider the interests of upstream suppliers and downstream users ...
- ... and consumers

Transparent processes

- Consult, and make public the views of all participants
 - So special pleading exposed
- Make report and recommendations public
 - So balancing of interests made clear



Regional examples

- Actual institutions vary, reflecting unique history of each economy
- Council on Economic and Fiscal Policy in Japan
 - transparency, economy-wide view, longevity(?)
- Taskforce approach in Vietnam
 - independence, economy-wide view, commitment(?)
- Productivity Commission in Australia
 - independence (via tenure), transparency, economy-wide view
- National Economic and Development Authority in the Philippines, BAPPENAS in Indonesia
 - → potential to convert old-fashioned planning institutions into new role of undertaking rolling ex ante and ex post policy reviews???



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