



## Pacific Economic Cooperation Council

Pacific Economic Outlook: Structure 2007 – Aging and Economic  
Growth Potentials in the Pacific Region  
Background Papers

# CHINA

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## 1. INTRODUCTION

Since the 1970s the family planning program has been in place throughout rural and urban China and, as a result, this practice has shortened China's demographic transition process from the phase characterized by high birth rate and low death rate, to the phase characterized by both low birth rate and low death rate. Consequently, the age structure of the population has changed, with the aged proportion rapidly increasing. According to the year 2000 census, China has already become an aging country, with 7 percent of its population aged 65 and above.

The economic development potential is link to the changes of population age structure. Population dividend has contributed to China economic development since 1980s. With the population aging, the first population dividend will come to an end, but the second population dividend can be got by China and contribute to China economic development with the appropriate economic and public policies.

This paper is organized as follows. In the second section below, we review the recent and projected changes in China's population age structure. In the third section, we discuss the population dividend and its impact of changes in the age structure on China's economy. In the fourth section, we discuss the impact of population aging on saving and investment. The last section is the conclusions and policy implications.

## 2. THE DEMOGRAPHIC CHANGES

Like other countries experienced changes in population age structure, mortality and fertility are main two factors that drive age structure change in China. Currently, the total fertility rate is below the replacement level in China. In 1971, the total fertility rate was as high as 5.4 and natural population growth rate was 23.3 per thousand in China. With a strict population policy, the birth rate has been successfully controlled. In the meantime, the increase in per capita income of rural and urban residents and improvements in education, especially for women, have also contributed to the decline in fertility. Since 1998 the natural population growth rate has been below 10 per thousand annually, and currently the total fertility rate is about 1.8. As a result of the decline in birth rate, the population structure has rapidly changed, with increasing aging in the population. The five national censuses show that the proportion of population aged 65 and above was 4.4 percent in 1953, 3.6 percent in 1964, 4.9 percent in 1982, 5.6 percent in 1990 and 7.0 percent in 2000. By definition, China is now among the aging countries.

As shown in Figure 1, except a sharp increase in mortality caused by the Great Leap Forward famine of 1959-1961, Mortality decline was especially rapid after 1949. Up to 1977, Mortality declined to around 7‰. Since then, mortality in China has been kept around 6.5‰. As shown in Figure 2, mortality decline resulted in a near doubling of life expectancy, from 42 and 46 years for males and females, respectively, around 1950 to 70 and 74 years in the year 2000.

China's fertility and birth rate profile contains some unique characteristics, result-

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ing from its history of social and demographic change. Figure 1 shows: followed a plunge in fertility caused by the Great Leap Forward famine of 1959-1961, there are a sharp rebound in the birth rate that lasted for several years. The highest birth rate is 43.37‰ of 1963. During the period of 1962-1972, the birth rate annually is beyond 30‰. Assisted by a Government birth control program that called for later marriage, longer birth intervals, and fewer births, China's birth rate declined within a decade from 33.43‰ children in 1970 to 18.21‰ in 1980. In the 1980s, despite the newly implemented one-child policy, the birth rate in China did not decline again and fluctuated around 22‰. In the 1990s, however, China's birth rate renewed its downward trajectory. In 2000, Chinese birth rate is 14.03‰; In 2005, it is 12.4‰. The drastic birth rate decline within a relatively short time period is rarely seen elsewhere in the world.

As shown in Figure 3, as a result of the changes in mortality and fertility, the natural growth rates of population of China are beyond 20‰ from 1950 to 1973, except 1959, 1960 and 1961. During the period of 1974-1979, the natural growth rate of population of China declined from 17.48‰ to 11.66‰. In 1980s, the natural growth rate of population of China is higher than the level of the second half of 1970s and kept around 15‰. Since 1990, the natural growth rate of population of China has been declining. The level of the natural growth rate of population in 2005 is only 5.89‰.

According to China's 2000 Population Census, the total population was 1.29533 billion. In addition, according to 《China's Population and Development in the 21st Century》 issued by Information Office of the State Council of the People's Republic of China in November 2000, the total population of China has to be less than 1.33, 1.4 and 1.6 billion in 2005, 2010 and 2050. The aim of first stage has been realized. The total population of China at the end of 2005 is 1.30756 billion. Owing to the strict population policy, the date that the total population gets to 1.3 billion is delayed four years.

Besides the population growth, another result of the changes in mortality and fertility is the population age structure. China's population age structure reflects the effects of these underlying demographic forces. As shown in Table 1, at the start of China's recent economic boom, 1982, China's population age structure was largely a bottom-heavy one, characteristic of a young and growing population. In contrast, by 2000, China's population age structure was that of a mature population, where the largest shares are found in the working age populations. According to the result of 1 percent population spot check issued by National Statistic Bureau in August 28, 2006, by 2005, the population of aged 0-14 is 264.78 million, made up 20.27 percent of the total population; the population of aged 15-59 is 897.42 million, made up 68.70 percent of the total population; the population of aged 60 and over is 144.08 million, made up 11.03 percent of the total population (among them, the population of aged 65 and over is 100.45 million, made up 7.68 percent of the total population).

Demographically, China has transformed itself from a "demographic transitional" society, where reductions in mortality led to rapid population growth and subsequent reductions in fertility led to a slower population growth, to a "post-transitional" society, where life expectancy has reached new heights, fertility has declined to low level, and rapid population aging is on the horizon.

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In February 23, 2006, the office of China National Committee on Aging issued the study report of the development trend of Chinese aging. The general conclusion is population ageing is enduring and irreversible in twenty-first century. The proportion of older persons continues to rise, and this trend is expected to continue during the whole twenty-first century.

According to the forecast study report, the older population has been getting more and population aging has been getting faster since 1999 when China transferred from a mature society to older society. Projected older population in 2100 is 318 million, and make up 31.09 percent of the total population. The strict period of population aging is the period of 2030-2050. During the period of 2030-2050, in one aspect, the number of older population and the level of population aging increase rapidly and get to an unprecedented high level, the fastest growing age group is the oldest-old, those aged 80 years and over, China's elderly population is expected to hit 437 million in 2051; in another aspect, after 2030, the total support ratio will increase by a big margin with older support ratio growing rapidly, and the total support ratio will exceed 50 percent. The golden period of population with low support ratio that benefit for economic growth will come to an end in 2033. Generally, the total support ratio and the older support ratio are 60-70 percent and 40-50 percent. Up to the second half of 21<sup>st</sup> century, the number of older population, the level of population aging and the older population aging will get stable and keep in a high level after 50 years rapid growth. The older population will be around 300 million, the level of population aging will be 31 percent and the number of the aged 80 and over will be 80-90 million, and the level of aging of the older population will be 25-30 percent. The issues of serious population aging and older population aging get more obvious. Besides the issue of population aging, there is still population issue for China. The total population in China will be around 1400 million in 2050. So China has to face dual population issues in 21<sup>st</sup> century, one is the population aging, and another is too much population. The total population of China will hit a peak that is in 2030, and projected population is 1,465 million.

Table 2 and 3 shows China population prospects done by United Nations. The china population profile in the World Population Prospects (the 2004 Revision) of United Nations is similar to the forecast study report of the office of China National Committee on Aging.

### 3. POPULATION DIVIDEND AND ECONOMIC GROWTH POTENTIAL

Projections show China's age structure would have moved from one that is characteristic of a young and growing population to an old and declining one within half of a century. What effect, if any, may these profound demographic changes as seen in these age structures have on China's economy? In followed paragraphs we will focus on the population dividend and its changes for China economic growth potential.

The demographic transition interacts with a fundamental feature of any economy—its lifecycle variation in consumption and production. Humans have an extended period of economic dependency at the beginning of their lives and, in modern industrial societies, at the end. During these ages of dependency or production-deficit ages, individuals consume, on average, more than they produce. During the

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prime working ages or surplus ages, individuals produce more than they consume. The divergence between production and consumption interacts with changes in population age structure to generate what is called a demographic dividend (Bloom and Williamson, 1998; Mason, 2001; Bloom and others, 2002) that more recently has been described as two demographic dividends (Mason and Lee, forthcoming). The first dividend arises because the demographic transition induces changes in population age structure that increase the share of the population concentrated at the productive ages. The second dividend arises as individual behavior and public policy respond to anticipated changes in population age structure.

Although macroeconomic effects of the demographic transition could be outweighed and obscured by the effects of business cycles, productivity growth, public policies, and other influences, it is clear that the first population dividend will come to an end with the population aging and the support ratio increasing for China.

From the end of 1978 until 2005, China's average annual GDP growth rate is more than 9 percent. China's share of world trade has grown more rapidly. At the end of 2005, China's total trade volume reached 1422.1 billion dollars, ranking it the fourth of the world. The trade volume accounted for more than 60 percent of GDP, while in 1978 the trade/GDP ratio was less than 10 percent. China's share in world merchandise trade has more than doubled over the last decade and exceeded 6 percent in 2004.

As table 4 and 5 shown, from 1982 to 2005, the demographic situation was especially favorable as changes in the dependency ratio had a strong positive effect on output per worker. Table 5 shows the dependency ratio decreased by 24 percent or at an average annual rate of 2.05 percent. During the same period real GDP per capita grew at an annual rate of 8.79 percent per year. Thus, the first demographic dividend accounted for 23 percent of China's economic growth between 1982 and 2005.

As Table 6 shown, for the most part the gains from the first demographic dividend have been reaped in China. Between 2005 and 2013 the dependency ratio is projected to continue to decline but at a much slower pace. For the entire period the first dividend yields an increase in output per capita of 4 percent—an annual growth rate of 0.3 percent. The dependency ratio is projected to reach a bottom in 2013 and then begin a sustained, gradual increase. By 2050, the projected dependency ratio will be 65 percent. During the period of 2014-2050, growth in output per capita will be reduced as a result of changing age structure as the first demographic dividend passes if all else being equal.

What is worth noticing is that massive rural-urban migration has filled up the age difference between rural and urban areas. It is expected that the relatively younger rural population would potentially ease the pain of rapidly aging urban areas.

The gains from the second population dividend also have been reaped in China. As figure 6 shown, China has kept the high capital formation rate since 1980s. The direct results of high capital formation rate are the higher capital-labor ratio and TFP that contribute to labor productivity and economic growth. As table 7 shown, most of China GDP growth resulted from the labor productivity growth. It means

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the high capital formation rate is very important for China economy growth up to now.

As figure 6 and table 8 shown, there has been surplus balance of current account for many years in China. The surplus balance of current account has been getting larger in recent years. Furthermore, besides the surplus balance of current account, the balance of capital and finance account is also surplus. It is scarcely seen in developing economy. In general, it is scarce of capital for developing countries. China should have the same situation. There are many reasons for China lasting high saving rate. No matter what the reasons are, China should use the savings efficiently. The surplus balance of current account shows there is still space for Chinese government to take measures to improve the efficiency of resource allocation and get more from the demographic transition.

Economic theory suggests that the demographic transition boosts saving in its early phases. Eventually, though, it should reduce saving as a larger portion of the population retires and reaches old age. In China, in the next decade the possible decline in saving resulting from the aging of the population and the rise in the population share of the elderly is likely to be more than offset by the increase in the share of workers in the latter half of their working life that they find to be particularly high savers. The demographic factors by themselves would imply higher household saving over the next decade. As the old-aged dependent ratio continues to rise and low-saving younger cohorts become more dominant in the working age the saving rate will begin to decline after 2 decades or more.

So with the deepening reform and more efficiency of resource allocation, the higher saving rate is good for China economic growth. The high growth rate will be kept if there is no interrupt by accident.

#### **4. THE POPULATION AGING ON SAVING**

According to the sectoral patterns of saving derived from the flow of funds tables in the national accounts, government saving is high and constitutes a large and increasing source of saving in China. Although most of the saving is contributed by enterprises and household, government saving remains important, the share of government saving increased from 11.15 percent to 21.72 percent during 1995-2003. The saving rate of government sector has been getting higher from 31.05 percent raised to 42.66 percent during 1992-2003. At the same period, the saving rate of household sector has been getting lower from 31.12 percent declined to 28.89 percent.

The features of the sectoral patterns of saving derived from the flow of funds tables in the national accounts are the result of financial sector inefficiency in resource allocation and delayed payment to social security system, especially to pension system.

In 1997, the State Council issued the Decision on Establishing a Uniform Basic Pension System for Enterprise Workers, adopting a combination of individual account and social pooling as the uniform pension system. According to the Decision, the individual account is based on an 11 percent wage contribution, of which individuals and the rest by employers pay 8 percentage points. The provincial governments determine the contribution rate by enterprises to form the pooling funds, in

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general not more than 20 percent of the total wage expenditure of the enterprise. Since 1998, the management of pension provision has been converted to provincial level and experimenting in social provision has begun in some regions. Because there was no accumulation of pension funds at enterprise level, the newly established funds have to fill the gap between actual payment needed and money collected. Under this scheme, workers who began their work after the reform started can save for their own retirement without problem, but the retired have no accumulation at all. And workers who joined the enterprise before the reform leave a gap uncovered by their own savings. The latter's individual account turns out to be an empty one. To fill the gap, therefore, is the major aim of further reform of the pension system. In 2001, the state initiated a pilot reform program for the social security system in Liaoning province and other selected cities.

Being in a double transition of demography and the pension system, China faces the challenge of double precautions for its incoming era of aging. First of all, changed age structure in the population imposes the heavy burden of supporting the elderly working population. Secondly, the success of transition from the enterprise-based pension provision to a social pooling system conditions society's ability to raise funds. Because of the transitional costs (filling the deficit in accumulation of the transitional generation), the financial burden will be extremely heavy.

When government has to pay the transitional costs and support enough the elderly population, it is difficult for the government to keep the high saving rate. Nevertheless, government saving and investment has played an important role in capital formation until now.

## 5. CONCLUSION AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS


China has entered the aging society very rapidly. For developed countries, it takes generally about 100 years to become an aging society from the birth rate reduction while it only takes more than 20 years for China to reach the initiative stage of the aging society from the reduction of the birth rate in 1970s to early in 1980s to the beginning of this century. It is undeniable that family planning policy China adopted is the factor for pushing forward and accelerating the process of population aging. It is also attributed to the rapid development of Chinese economy and society, and to the quick improvement of disease control, healthy conditions and the quality of life. China will be an irreversible aging society in 21st century. In 2005, China has 100.55 million aged above 65, accounting for 7.7 percent of the total. It is forecasted that the aged population will reach 170 million in 2010, 12.5 percent of the total, 243 million, 17 percent of the total in 2020, and 437 million, 31 percent of the total in 2051, according to China National Committee on Aging. China will be the only country in the world that grows old before becoming rich.

Although China officially became an aging society in 1999, macroeconomic effects of the population aging are little obvious until now. Nevertheless, we expect it will get clear because the first population dividend will come to an end with the progress of aging and the comparative advantage in labor-intensive industries will be eroded by the population aging. Chinese government has been paying attention to the issue of population aging and its effects on Chinese economy. With the population aging, Chinese government will take proper measures, such as setting up the social security system and deepening the financial sector's reform and openness to


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resolve issues related to population aging and realize China economic growth potential.

**Figure 1. Birth rate and death rate: 1950-2005**




**Figure 2. Life expectancy: 1981, 1990, 2000**



Source: Statistics on National Population Census in 1982, 1990, and 2000




**Figure 3. Natural growth rate: 1950-2005**




Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005

**Figure 4. Total populations: 1958-2005**




Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005

**Figure 5. Net exports of goods and services, capital formation rate: 1981-2005**



Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005  
China Statistical Abstract 2006

**Figure 6. The saving rate of government and household sector, 1992-2003**



**Table 1. China's population age structure: 1953-2005**

Year	1953	1964	1982	1995	2000	2004	2005
Population(10 thousands)	59435	69458	101654	121121	126743	129988	130756
Percentage (%)							
Aged 0-14	36.3	40.7	33.6	26.6	22.9	21.5	20.3
Aged 15-64	59.3	55.7	61.5	67.2	70.1	70.9	72
Aged 65and over	4.4	3.6	4.9	6.2	7.0	7.6	7.7

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005  
China Statistical Abstract 2006

**Table 2. China's demographic profile: 2005-2050 (medium variant)**

Indicator	2005	2010	2015	2020	2025
Population (thousands)	1 315 844	1 354 533	1 392 980	1 423 939	1 441 426
Male population (thousands)	675 852	694 643	712 911	726 935	733 698
Female population (thousands)	639 992	659 890	680 069	697 004	707 728
Population sex ratio (males per 100 females)	105.6	105.3	104.8	104.3	103.7
Percentage aged 0-4 (%)	6.4	6.3	6.4	6.2	5.6
Percentage aged 5-14 (%)	15	13.2	12.1	12.2	12.3
Percentage aged 15-24 (%)	16.5	16.1	14.1	12.5	11.6
Percentage aged 60 or over (%)	10.9	12.5	15.1	17.1	20.1
Percentage aged 65 or over (%)	7.6	8.3	9.6	11.9	13.7
Percentage aged 80 or over (%)	1.1	1.4	1.7	1.9	2.2
Percentage of women aged 15-49 (%)	56.5	55.8	53	48.4	44.9
Median age (years)	32.6	34.9	36.5	37.9	39.5
Population density (per sq. km)	137	141	145	148	150
Indicator	2030	2035	2040	2045	2050
Population (thousands)	1 446 453	1 442 974	1 433 431	1 416 926	1 392 307
Male population (thousands)	733 853	729 895	723 244	713 590	700 472
Female population (thousands)	712 599	713 079	710 187	703 336	691 834
Population sex ratio (males per 100 females)	103	102.4	101.8	101.5	101.2
Percentage aged 0-4 (%)	5.2	5.1	5.2	5.2	5.1
Percentage aged 5-14 (%)	11.7	10.8	10.4	10.4	10.6
Percentage aged 15-24 (%)	12	12.2	11.7	11	10.6
Percentage aged 60 or over (%)	24	27.1	28.2	29.2	31
Percentage aged 65 or over (%)	16.3	19.8	22.3	23	23.6
Percentage aged 80 or over (%)	2.8	3.9	4.5	5.7	7.2
Percentage of women aged 15-49 (%)	43.8	42.8	40.7	39.4	38.7
Median age (years)	41.5	43	44.1	44.7	44.8
Population density (per sq. km)	151	150	149	148	145

Source: World Population Prospects (the 2004 Revision), United Nations

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**Table 3. China's population aged 60+, 65+, 80+: 1950-2050**

Year	Population (Thousands)			Percentage (%)		
	Aged 60+	Aged 65+	Aged 80+	Aged 60+	Aged 65+	Aged 80+
1950	41 572	24 851	1 559	7.5	4.5	0.3
1955	46 195	28 109	1 893	7.6	4.6	0.3
1960	47 516	31 769	2 344	7.2	4.8	0.4
1965	50 857	32 057	3 114	7	4.4	0.4
1970	56 787	35 806	4 002	6.8	4.3	0.5
1975	64 335	40 830	5 105	6.9	4.4	0.6
1980	73 865	47 426	4 329	7.4	4.7	0.4
1985	86 212	55 478	6 111	8.1	5.2	0.6
1990	99 078	64 357	7 839	8.6	5.6	0.7
1995	113 639	74 178	8 821	9.3	6.1	0.7
2000	128 684	87 228	11 373	10.1	6.8	0.9
2005	143 907	100 020	14 766	10.9	7.6	1.1
2010	168 919	112 214	18 582	12.5	8.3	1.4
2015	210 225	133 437	23 225	15.1	9.6	1.7
2020	243 848	169 353	27 386	17.1	11.9	1.9
2025	289 985	197 268	31 560	20.1	13.7	2.2
2030	347 776	236 171	40 448	24	16.3	2.8
2035	391 130	285 001	55 999	27.1	19.8	3.9
2040	404 792	319 370	65 167	28.2	22.3	4.5
2045	413 434	325 908	80 338	29.2	23	5.7
2050	431 532	329 103	100 551	31	23.6	7.2

Source: World Population Prospects (the 2004 Revision), United Nations

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**Table 4. Actual demographic profile (%): 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, and 2000**

Age	1953	1964	1982	1990	2000
0-4	15.73	14.52	9.43	10.30	5.55
5-9	11.06	13.65	11.03	8.79	7.26
10-14	9.48	12.52	13.13	8.61	10.09
15-19	9.12	9.01	12.49	10.64	8.30
20-24	8.16	7.37	7.40	11.12	7.61
25-29	7.46	7.31	9.22	9.22	9.47
30-34	6.71	6.77	7.27	7.40	10.25
35-39	6.39	5.97	5.41	7.63	8.79
40-44	5.58	5.17	4.82	5.64	6.54
45-49	5.07	4.47	4.72	4.35	6.89
50-54	4.29	3.84	4.06	4.03	5.09
55-59	3.62	3.27	3.37	3.69	3.74
60-64	2.91	2.56	2.73	3.01	3.35
65-69	2.08	1.69	2.11	2.33	2.80
70-74	1.43	1.60	2.06	1.38	1.07
75-79	0.86	0.97	1.28	0.63	0.54
80-84	0.36	0.48	0.65	0.25	0.21
85 and over	0.13	0.30	0.33	0.07	0.05

Source: Statistics on National Population Census in 1953, 1964, 1982, 1990, and 2000.

**Table 5. Dependency ratios of population in 1982, 1990, 1995, 2000, and 2005(%)**

	1982	1990	1995	2000	2005
Gross dependency ratio	62.6	49.93	48.81	42.66	38.88
Children dependency ratio	54.63	41.53	39.58	32.67	28.19
Old people dependency ratio	7.97	8.4	9.23	9.99	10.69

Source: China Statistical Abstract 2006.

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**Table 6. Dependency ratios of population: 1950-2050**

Year	Total	Child	Old-age
1950	61	54	7
1955	72	64	8
1960	78	69	9
1965	80	72	8
1970	79	71	8
1975	78	70	8
1980	67	59	8
1985	55	47	8
1990	50	41	8
1995	48	39	9
2000	46	36	10
2005	41	30	11
2010	38	27	11
2015	39	26	13
2020	43	26	17
2025	46	26	20
2030	50	25	24
2035	55	25	31
2040	61	25	36
2045	63	26	37
2050	65	26	39

Source: World Population Prospects (the 2004 Revision), United Nations

**Table 7. Sources and aspects of growth (1978-2005) (average annual increase, in percent)**

	1978-93	1993-2005
GDP growth	9.7	9.5
Employment growth	2.5	1.1
Labor productivity growth	7.0	8.4
From TFP growth	3.8	3.0
From increasing K/L ratio	3.1	5.3
Memorandum items (in percent)		
Investment/GDP ratio (period average)	29.4	36.6

Source: NBS (2005), and world bank staff estimates.

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**Table 8. Current, capital and finance account balance (thousand \$)**

Year	Current	Capital and finance
1997	36,962,715	21,015,390
1998	31,471,279	-6,321,439
1999	21,114,138	5,179,515
2000	20,519,248	1,922,224
2001	17,405,275	34,775,427
2002	35,421,968	32,290,837
2003	45,874,812	52,725,942
2004	68,659,162	110,659,756
2005	160,818,311	62,963,916

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 2005  
China Statistical Abstract 2006

**Table 9. The sectoral patterns of saving derived from the flow of funds tables in the national accounts (billion RMB)**

	Non-financial enterprises	Financial institutes	Government	Household	Total
1992	3287.5	272.84	1572.63	5630.47	10763.43
1993	5194.95	398.53	2160.62	6691.81	14445.91
1994	7069.78	425.72	2441.65	10052.24	19989.38
1995	9187.96	430.88	2814.12	12814.6	25247.56
1996	8494.31	598.31	3641.23	14290.66	27024.5
1997	10549.96	287.74	4153.23	15266.75	29988.58
1998	10605.09	472.27	4071.07	15767.36	30915.79
1999	11136.99	450.75	4658.09	15019.9	31265.73
2000	13368.29	527.24	5647.6	14651.31	34194.44
2001	14308.7	291.05	7302.47	15601.11	37502.7
2002	13999.3	1042.9	7603.7	19566.7	42212.7
2003	15674.6	2615.4	11015.3	21402.7	50708.1

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**Table 10. The sectoral patterns of saving derived from the flow of funds tables in the national accounts (shares, %)**

	<b>Non-financial enterprises</b>	<b>Financial institutes</b>	<b>Government</b>	<b>Household</b>
1992	30.54	2.53	14.61	52.31
1993	35.96	2.76	14.96	46.32
1994	35.37	2.13	12.21	50.29
1995	36.39	1.71	11.15	50.76
1996	31.43	2.21	13.47	52.88
1997	35.18	0.96	13.85	50.91
1998	34.30	1.53	13.17	51.00
1999	35.62	1.44	14.90	48.04
2000	39.09	1.54	16.52	42.85
2001	38.15	0.78	19.47	41.60
2002	33.16	2.47	18.01	46.35
2003	30.91	5.16	21.72	42.21

Source: China Statistical Yearbook 1999-2006



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