

Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation

2004/ASCC/057

Panel: 12

Agricultural Trade Negotiations: Hot Issues

Purpose: Paper presented to ASCC, PECC Trade Forum-LAEBA Conference Submitted by: Mário Jales ICONE/Brazil



APEC Study Centers Consortium Viña del Mar, Chile 26 -29 May 2004





Agricultural Trade Negotiations: HOT ISSUES



Mário Jales Senior Researcher ICONE

APEC Study Centers Consortium Annual Meeting – Chile 2004

"The Challenges of APEC: Trade, Security and Capacity Building" Viña del Mar, 29 May 2004



SUMMARY

- 1. Overview
- 2. Market Access
- 3. Domestic Support
- 4. Export Competition

OVERVIEW

How uncompetitive countries distort agricultural markets



THREE PILLARS

AGRICULTURAL TRADE PROTECTIONISM

Restricted
Market
Access

Poorly
Restricted
Domestic
Support

Unfair Export Competition



INSTRUMENTS

- 1. Tariff Peaks
- 2. Tariff Escalation
- 3. Specific Tariffs
- 4. Tariff-Rate Quotas
- **5.** Special Safeguards
- 6. Non-Tariff Measures
- 7. Amber Box Payments
- 8. Blue Box Payments
- 9. De Minimis Payments
- 10. Export Subsidies
- 11. Export Credits
- 12. Abuse of Food Aid
- **13.** Trade Monopoly

Market Access

Domestic Support

Export Competition



AGRICULTURAL PROTECTIONISM: United States

Product	AVE (%)	TRQ	SSG	Specific Tariff	Tariff Escalation	Domestic Support	Export Subsidy
Milk (skim powder)	49.1	•	•	•	•	•	•
Sugar (raw)	167.0	•	•	•		•	
Chocolates	21.6	•	•	•	•		
Ethanol	46.3	•	•	•			
Beef (frozen)	26.4	•	•				
Orange Juice	44.5			•			
Pork (frozen)	0.7			•			
Chicken Meat (frozen)	16.9			•	•		•
Tobacco (unmanufactured)	350.0	•			•	•	

- 1. AVE: ad valorem equivalent; TRQ: tariff-rate quota; SSG: special safeguard.
- 2. All tariff rates are presented in the form of AVEs, and correspond to bound tariffs at the WTO at the 8-digit level of the Harmonized System.
- 3. Uniform external reference prices were used to convert specific tariffs into AVEs.

Source: ICONE. Based on WTO, COMTRADE/UN and TARIC/EU.

MARKET ACCESS

GOAL:

Reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers to agricultural trade



MARKET ACCESS: Hot Issues

Appropriate Forum:

REGIONAL & BILATERAL

US & EU

VS.

ALL LEVELS
G-20 & Cairns Group

Appropriate Method:

QUOTA INCREASE

US & EU

VS.

TARIFF REDUCTION
G-20 & Cairns Group

Appropriate Formula:

BLENDED FORMULA


US & EU

VS.

PROGRESSIVE CUT
G-20 & Cairns Group



APPROPRIATE FORUM: The Risk of a "Spaghetti Bowl"



Source: IDB-IPES 2002 - Beyond Borders: The New Regionalism in Latin America



APPROPRIATE FORMULA: The "Blended Formula"

Derbez Draft Framework for Agriculture

- 2.1. The formula applicable for tariff reduction by developed countries shall be a blended formula under which each element will contribute to substantial improvement in market access for all products. The formula shall be as follows:
- (i) [...]% of tariff lines shall be subject to a [...]% average tariff cut and a minimum of [...]%; for these import-sensitive tariff lines market access increase will result from a combination of tariff cuts and TRQs.

 URUGUAY ROUND REVISITED!

OROGOAT ROOMD REVIOITED:

- (ii) [...]% of tariff lines shall be subject to a Swiss Formula with a coefficient [...].
- (iii)[...]% of tariff lines shall be duty-free.




APPROPRIATE FORMULA:Different Types of Tariff Distribution

Tariff Profile	USA	EU	Mercosur	
Mean	12.4%	29.3%	10.2%	
Median	4.4%	14.4%	10.0%	
Standard deviation	29.8%	40.3%	6.0%	
Maximum	350.0%	277.2%	55.0%	
Minimum	0.0%	0.0%	0.0%	
Coefficient of variation	2.40	1.37	0.58	

Sources: USITC, European Commission, and Brazilian Ministry of Industry, Development and Foreign Trade. All specific and mixed tariffs were converted into *ad valorem* equivalents (AVE) using international reference prices. The figures for Mercosur are based on Brazil's list of exceptions to the CET.



APPROPRIATE FORMULA: United States Tariff Distribution (2003)



Source: USITC.


DOMESTIC SUPPORT

GOAL:

Reduction of trade-distorting domestic support



DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Early Uruguay Round



Trade Distorting Subsidies

→ Not Allowed

Trade Distorting Subsidies


→ Monitored, Global Capping

No or Minimally Trade Distorting

→ Allowed



DOMESTIC SUPPORT:Late Uruguay Round



Trade Distorting Subsidies

→ Monitored, Capping

Trade Distorting Subsidies with Supply Control


→ Allowed

No or Minimally Trade Distorting

→ Allowed



DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Doha Round



Trade Distorting Subsidies

→ Monitored, Capping

Trade Distorting Subsidies with Supply Control

→ Allowed

No or Minimally Trade Distorting

→ Allowed



DOMESTIC SUPPORT: Hot Issues

Appropriate Forum:

MULTILATERAL
US & EU

VS.

ALL LEVELS
G-20 & Cairns Group

Appropriate Method:

NEW BLUE BOX
US & EU

VS.

CUT IN AMS

NEW BLUE BOX PHASE OUT

G-20 & Cairns Group

OVERALL COMMITMENTS

US & EU


VS.

SPECIFIC COMMITMENTS

G-20 & Cairns Group



DOMESTIC SUPPORT IN THE US: SHARE OF SUBSIDIES IN PRODUCTION VALUE



EXPORT COMPETITION

GOAL:

Reduction with a view to eliminate all forms of export subsidy



EXPORT COMPETITION

EXPORT SUBSIDY

European Union

EXPORT CREDIT

United States

TRADE MONOPOLY

Australia & Canada

FOOD AID

United States & others

- → Full vs. Partial Elimination
- → Full Parallelism



CONCLUSIONS

- The EU-US position at the WTO negotiations on agriculture is insufficient to achieve the goals of the Doha Round
 - An alternative to the Blended Formula is necessary;
 - ➤ The suggested domestic support disciplines do very little to reduce trade distorting practices.
- Agreement on "parallelism" in export competition likely between EU and US. Canada unlikely to accept.
- Developing countries more active and better organized in the current round.
- Cotton Case (and possibly Sugar Case) will force the US and the EU to revise domestic support mechanisms.
- Multilateralism vs. Regionalism.



Institute for International Trade Negotiations

THANK YOU - GRACIAS - 谢谢

MARIO JALES
mjales@iconebrasil.org.br
www.iconebrasil.org.br